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THE QUANTUM OF SUSPICION NEEDED FOR AN EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES SEARCH
Kit Kinports*

ABSTRACT
For decades, the United States Supreme Court opinions articulating the
standard of exigency necessary to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement have been maddeningly opaque and
confusing. Some cases require probable cause, others call for reasonable suspicion,
and still others use undefined and unhelpful terms such as “reasonable to believe”
in describing how exigent the situation must be to permit the police to proceed
without a warrant. Not surprisingly, the conflicting signals coming from the
Supreme Court have led to disagreement in the lower courts.
To resolve this conflict and provide guidance to law enforcement officials and
lower court judges, this Article proposes a three-step solution. First, the Court
should reaffirm that probable cause to enter is a prerequisite for any exigent
circumstances search: probable cause to believe, for example, that a suspect or piece
of evidence is presently located on the premises. Second, the Court should clarify
that any full search also requires probable cause of exigency: an independent
finding of probable cause to believe that taking the time to obtain a warrant would
result in some untoward consequence. This Article thus rejects the views expressed
by some scholars that the Court already does—or should—allow at least some
exigent circumstances searches on a standard lower than probable cause. Third,
the Court should retreat from its opinions holding that a police officer’s subjective
motivations are irrelevant in the subset of exigent circumstances cases where the
entry is purportedly intended to provide emergency aid or further some other nonlaw-enforcement interest. Rather, the Court should recognize that these searches
are, in essence, administrative inspections and therefore should demand proof that
the primary purpose of the entry was actually to provide assistance, rather than to
investigate a crime or conduct a pretextual search for evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court opinions describing the amount of exigency needed to support a warrantless search under the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement have long varied. Some decisions speak in terms of
probable cause, others require reasonable suspicion, and many
others use amorphous, undefined phrases such as “reasonable to
believe.” These unexplained fluctuations in the Court’s standard of
exigency have generated uncertainty and conflicts among the lower courts.
To resolve these discrepancies, this Article recommends a threepart approach. First, law enforcement officials should have probable cause to enter the premises in order to make any exigent circumstances search—probable cause to believe, for example, that a
wanted suspect or evidence of a crime can be found on the property. Second, even when police have probable cause to search, a warrantless full search under the exigent circumstances exception
should also require an additional and distinct finding of probable
cause: probable cause to believe that some exigency justifies the
failure to obtain a warrant. The lesser standard of reasonable suspicion of exigency should be sufficient to justify only intrusions
that are less invasive than a full search, such as a protective sweep, a
no-knock entry, or an impoundment of the premises while a warrant is obtained. Finally, to maintain consistency with the Fourth
Amendment standards governing administrative searches, entries
to offer emergency aid or to serve some other non-lawenforcement interest should require proof that the police were
primarily motivated by the need to provide that assistance and were
1
not conducting a pretextual search for evidence.
In sketching out this proposal, the Article proceeds in three
parts. Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, setting out the conflict in the Court’s descriptions of the amount of
exigency required to justify an exigent circumstances search and
highlighting the disagreement that conflict has created in the low1. Although this summary is written in terms of Fourth Amendment “searches,” the
proposal also applies to intrusions that qualify as Fourth Amendment “seizures.” See infra
notes 15–16 & 140 and accompanying text.
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er courts. Rejecting the argument that terms like “reasonable to believe” necessarily connote a standard lower than probable cause,
Part II traces the history of the Court’s use of such language in its
Fourth Amendment rulings and the varying definitions the Court
has given that term. Part III then defends the Article’s proposed
approach, separately analyzing each of its three elements.
I. THE CONFLICT CREATED BY THE SUPREME COURT
As a general rule, compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s
2
ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures” dictates that any
search or seizure must be supported by both probable cause and a
warrant, “subject only to a few specifically established and well3
delineated exceptions.” The Supreme Court has long recognized
exigent circumstances as one of the principal exceptions to the
4
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
The notion of exigency encompasses a number of different concerns. Some are traditional law enforcement interests: the need to
5
apprehend a fleeing suspect, to prevent the destruction of evi6
dence, or to protect the public or officers from a dangerous per7
son or item. Others are “emergency assistance” or “community
8
caretaking” interests: the need to help an injured person or to
9
safeguard someone’s property. Although, as discussed below, lower court judges and scholars disagree about the relationship be10
tween these different varieties of exigency, the Supreme Court
has treated them all as subcategories of a single exigent circum11
stances exception to the warrant requirement.

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)). On occasion, the Court has departed from this warrant presumption
model and has instead assessed the constitutionality of a search by using a balancing test to
determine whether the search was reasonable. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448
(2013); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118–19 (2001). See generally 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 10.01[C] (6th ed. 2013).
4. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001) (discussed infra notes 25–26
and accompanying text).
7. See, e.g., Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298–99.
8. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (discussed infra notes 23,
72–85 & 125–37 and accompanying text).
9. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (discussed infra notes 157–
61 and accompanying text).
10. See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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The Court has been less consistent, however, in articulating the
quantum of proof of exigency necessary to justify a warrantless
search or seizure in exigent circumstances. Some Supreme Court
decisions mandate that law enforcement officials have probable
cause to believe some adverse consequence will occur if they must
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Others require reasonable suspicion. And frequently, the Court’s opinions
use vague, undefined terms such as “reason to believe” or “reasonable belief.”
In Minnesota v. Olson, for example, the Supreme Court endorsed
a probable cause requirement in affirming the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances did not excuse the
officers’ failure to obtain a warrant before entering a home to con12
duct an arrest. The Court noted that the state supreme court had
applied “the proper legal standard” in requiring “at least probable
cause to believe that one or more . . . of the . . . factors justifying
the [warrantless] entry were present” (unless the police were in hot
13
pursuit of a fleeing suspect). That language suggests that the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause to believe a
warrantless entry is necessary to prevent the “imminent destruction
of evidence, . . . a suspect’s escape, or the risk of danger to the po14
lice or other persons.”
Likewise, in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that the use of
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon—a “seizure” in Fourth
15
Amendment terms —is permissible only if the police have “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of
16
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Similar
language requiring probable cause has appeared in a number of
the Justices’ separate opinions discussing the exigent circumstanc17
es exception.
12. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
13. See id. (likewise observing that the court below “applied essentially the correct
standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed”).
14. Id. (quoting State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1989), aff’d, 495 U.S. 91
(1990)).
15. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
16. Id. at 3; see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (applying the same standard).
17. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 177 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the exigent circumstances exception applies if police have “probable cause to believe that failure to act would result in” the destruction of evidence); Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326, 337 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (pointing out that probable cause to believe evidence will be destroyed “exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the
accepted exigent circumstances exception”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 759 (1984)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that a warrantless entry to arrest is permissible based on
“probable cause to believe that the delay involved in procuring an arrest warrant will gravely
endanger the officer or other persons or will result in the suspect’s escape”); cf. Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 141 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has required only reasonable
suspicion that some untoward consequence will result if police are
forced to adhere to the usual Fourth Amendment requirements.
Reasonable suspicion is, of course, the quantum of evidence neces18
sary to conduct a Terry stop-and-frisk. In Maryland v. Buie, for example, the Court rejected probable cause as “unnecessarily strict”
and instead adopted Terry’s reasonable suspicion requirement as
the standard for allowing a protective sweep of a home beyond the
19
areas “immediately adjoining the place of arrest.” Such sweeps are
permissible, the Court held, if the police have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a
20
danger to those on the arrest scene.”
Likewise, the Court’s opinion in Richards v. Wisconsin concluded
that a reasonable suspicion standard—“as opposed to a probable
cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance” between “legitimate law enforcement concerns” and “individual privacy interests” in determining when police may enter without complying
21
with the Fourth Amendment’s knock-and-announce requirement.
Thus, Richards allows police to make a no-knock entry to execute a
warrant based on “reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence . . . would be dangerous or futile, or that
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for ex22
ample, allowing the destruction of evidence.”
Finally, the Court at times has required a reasonable belief, or
reason to believe, that an exigency exists in order to justify dispensing with the usual Fourth Amendment requirements. Language
along these lines has appeared in several Supreme Court opinions
authorizing a warrantless “emergency assistance” or “community
caretaking” entry. In Brigham City v. Stuart, for example, the Court
held that law enforcement officials may enter a home without a
warrant “when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened

“creat[ing] a new exception to the warrant requirement to justify warrantless entry short of
exigency” by allowing the police to enter despite a co-occupant’s refusal to consent if they
have “‘good reason’” to believe that “‘violence (or threat of violence) has occurred or is
about to (or soon will) occur’” (quoting id. at 118 (majority opinion))); Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the exigent circumstances
exception should have allowed a warrantless entry where police had “probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that immediate action was necessary” (emphasis
added)).
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–27 (1968) (rejecting a probable cause requirement).
19. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 334 (1990).
20. Id. at 336.
21. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
22. Id.
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with such injury.” 23 In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Court likewise concluded that “concern for the safety of the general public” allowed
the warrantless “community caretaking” search of an automobile
that was “reasonably believed to contain a gun.” 24
The Court has also suggested that reasonable belief is the requisite quantum of suspicion in some cases involving the threatened
destruction of evidence. In Illinois v. McArthur, for example, the
Court allowed law enforcement officials to prevent a suspect from
entering his residence unaccompanied by the police while they ob25
tained a search warrant for the home. One of the Court’s justifications for permitting the officers to secure the premises in McArthur was that “[t]hey reasonably believed that the home’s resident,
26
if left free of any restraint, would destroy th[e] evidence.”
Similarly, in Schmerber v. California, the Court approved of a warrantless blood draw in a DUI case where the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatened ‘the
27
destruction of evidence.’” When the same issue recently returned
to the Court in Missouri v. McNeely, the majority rejected the notion
that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream creates a
per se exigency in DUI cases, but quoted with approval Schmerber’s
28
“might reasonably have believed” language. The Court concluded
that “our analysis in Schmerber fits comfortably within our case law
29
applying the exigent circumstances exception.” Three of the Justices in the minority in McNeely, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, likewise took the position that “[t]he reasonable belief that
critical evidence is being destroyed gives rise to a compelling need
30
for [warrantless] blood draws.”

23. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006).
24. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 447–48 (1973); see also Michigan v. Fisher,
558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam) (noting that the “‘emergency aid exception’ . . . requires only ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that ‘a person within [the home] is
in need of immediate aid’” (first quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406; then quoting Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978))); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (acknowledging “the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence,” despite a cotenant’s objection, “so long as they have good reason to believe
such a threat exists”); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 (pointing out that “[n]umerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is
in need of immediate aid”).
25. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Schmerber v. California, 387 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
28. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 (2013) (quoting Schmerber, 387 U.S. at 770).
29. Id. at 151.
30. Id. at 169 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kentucky
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 n.5 (2011) (denying that Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
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In none of these opinions did the Court bother to define the
amorphous phrase “reasonably believed,” and the Justices appeared unconcerned with clarifying how it compares to the more
familiar constructs of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
Not surprisingly, therefore, lower court judges and scholars disagree on the meaning of terms such as “reasonable belief” in cases
31
involving exigent circumstances. Some lower court opinions
32
equate the language with probable cause. Others believe it is “less
33
exacting” than probable cause, with some analogizing it to rea-

(1948), was “a case about exigent circumstances” because “the Government did not claim
that [the] noise [the officers heard in that case] was a noise that would have led a reasonable officer to think that evidence was about to be destroyed”); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that the warrantless scraping of the
suspect’s fingernails was permissible in order to “assure the preservation of the evidence”
because “there was good reason to believe that Murphy might attempt to alter the status quo
unless he were prevented from doing so”).
For lower court opinions adopting the “reasonable belief” standard in destruction of
evidence cases, see, for example, United States v. Almonte-Báez, 857 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.
2017); United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d 283, 295 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677,
680 (7th Cir. 2001); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 25 N.E.3d 849, 855 (Mass. 2015); State v.
Walker, 62 A.3d 897, 904 (N.J. 2013); State v. Duran, 156 P.3d 795, 797 (Utah 2007); State v.
Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. 2000).
31. For discussion of the various approaches lower courts have taken in exigent circumstances cases, see Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 300–20 (1988); Megan Pauline Marinos, Comment, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to
the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 249, 263–73 (2012);
Geoffrey C. Sonntag, Note, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, or Mere Speculation?: Holding
Police to a Higher Standard in Destruction of Evidence Exigency Cases, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 629, 640–
46 (2003); Claire Frances Stamm, Comment, Defining the Destruction of Evidence Exigency Exception: Why Courts Should Adopt a Strict Probable Cause Standard in the Wake of Kentucky v. King, 82
MISS. L.J. 1417, 1423–26 (2013).
32. See, e.g., Almonte-Báez, 857 F.3d at 32 (discussing exigent circumstances); Sutterfield
v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing emergency aid); United
States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); Flores v. State, 994 P.2d 782, 784 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1999) (discussing exigency and emergency aid); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6(a), at 600 (5th ed. 2012) (describing
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), discussed supra text accompanying note 23); id.
§ 7.4(c), at 869 (describing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussed supra text accompanying note 24); cf. State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Iowa 2011) (observing that
the “probability” that evidence will be lost justifies a warrantless exigent circumstances
search); State v. Deluca, 775 A.2d 1284, 1287 (N.J. 2001) (defining exigent circumstances in
terms of the “probability” of exigency); State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516, 523 (Wis. 1983)
(relying on the Supreme Court’s definition of “traditional probable cause” in Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1984), as “relevant” in applying a reasonable belief standard in an emergency
aid case). For courts refusing to equate “reasonable belief” with probable cause, without
providing any affirmative definition of the term, see Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.
2018) (discussing emergency aid); State v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 427 (Colo. 2004) (same).
33. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing emergency aid and community caretaking); see also, e.g., State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa
1996) (addressing emergency aid); Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)
(same).
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sonable suspicion. 34 And still others view “reasonable belief” as a
separate standard distinct from both probable cause and reasona35
ble suspicion. Some in this third group take the position that reasonable belief requires a showing somewhere between probable
36
cause and reasonable suspicion, whereas others believe it is a
37
standard even lower than reasonable suspicion. Most lower court
opinions, following the Supreme Court’s lead, do not attempt to
define the term or to situate it on the probable cause/reasonable
38
suspicion spectrum.
As discussed in the following Part, terms like “reason to believe”
have also appeared in Supreme Court opinions addressing other
Fourth Amendment issues. Given the history of the Court’s use of
such language, it is wrong to assume that it necessarily requires a
standard less rigorous than probable cause in exigent circumstances cases.

34. See, e.g., United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 66–67 (1st Cir. 2004) (addressing
exigent circumstances), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Champagne v. United States, 543
U.S. 1102 (2005); Craig M. Bradley, A Sensible Emergency Doctrine, 42 TRIAL, Aug. 2006, at 60,
62 [hereinafter Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine] (discussing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398 (2006) (described supra text accompanying note 23)); Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 370–71 (2006) [hereinafter Bradley, Reasonable Policeman] (addressing the reasonable suspicion standards imposed
by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (described supra text accompanying notes 21–
22), and Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (described supra text accompanying notes
19–20)); Sonntag, supra note 31, at 637–38 (referring to Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326
(2001) (described supra text accompanying notes 25–26)). For an opinion using language
reminiscent of Terry’s “specific and articulable facts” standard in defining a reasonable belief, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), see People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 182
(Mich. 2011) (discussing community caretaking).
35. See, e.g., State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1040–43 (N.M. 2005) (distinguishing the “reasonable belief” necessary for a community caretaking search from both probable cause and
reasonable suspicion).
36. See, e.g., Stamm, supra note 31, at 1435 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398
(2006) (described supra text accompanying note 23), and Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326
(2001) (described supra text accompanying notes 25–26)).
37. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 964 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ohio 2012) (discussing community
caretaking and emergency aid); Isaac J. Colunga, When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional Function, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 65 n.113 (2010) (comparing the “reasonableness determination” adopted in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), to an “arbitrary and capricious standard,” requiring “simply . . . the ability to justify [a] decision with the facts in
the record”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing
destruction of evidence); Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (addressing community caretaking); United States v. Menchaca-Castruita, 587 F.3d 283, 295
(5th Cir. 2009) (discussing exigent circumstances); United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677,
680–81 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing destruction of evidence); State v. Neighbors, 328 P.3d
1081, 1091 (Kan. 2014) (discussing emergency aid); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 25 N.E.3d
849, 855 (Mass. 2015) (addressing destruction of evidence); State v. Walker, 62 A.3d 897,
904 (N.J. 2013) (same); State v. Duran, 156 P.3d 795, 797 (Utah 2007) (same); State v.
Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 602–03 (Wis. 2010) (addressing community caretaking); State v.
Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Wis. 2000) (discussing destruction of evidence).
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II. THE MEANING OF “REASON TO BELIEVE”
Exigency has historically been considered a justification for dispensing with a warrant, but not an exception to probable cause. 39
When the Court has used terms like “reasonable belief” in its exigent circumstances opinions without specifically equating that language with reasonable suspicion, the Justices have given no indication that they intended to lower the required quantum of proof to
something less than probable cause.
In fact, although the city argued in Brigham City v. Stuart that an
entry to provide emergency aid should be justifiable on a showing
40
of reasonable suspicion, the Solicitor General’s brief in that case
equated the term “reasonable to believe” with probable cause, acknowledging that probable cause was the appropriate standard.
“[A]n entry to render aid is not based on a ‘less demanding’ showing than a warrant, just a different showing,” the Solicitor General
pointed out, noting that “an emergency aid entry . . . must always
rest on known facts that make it objectively reasonable for an of41
ficer to believe that an immediate need for assistance exists.” The
Court did not resolve that issue, preferring to leave “reasonable ba42
sis for believing” undefined. Still, the discussion in the briefs indicates that the Justices were aware that the term is susceptible to different interpretations and does not necessarily connote a standard
lower than probable cause.
The Court’s use of ambiguous terms like “reasonable belief” in
Fourth Amendment cases is not confined to its exigent circumstances opinions. Although the Court’s rulings have ascribed different meanings to “reasonable belief,” they do not provide any
support for the assumption that the exigent circumstances decisions that have used this language without defining it have silently
departed from the probable cause requirement.
Admittedly, some of the references to “reasonable belief” in the
Court’s Fourth Amendment case law do imply a standard lower
39. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); see also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
40. See Brief for Petitioner at 18–20, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No.
05-502) (discussing the concept of a reasonable basis to believe, and arguing that “police
intervention to render emergency aid is justified upon a showing of individualized suspicion,
akin to reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause”).
41. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502); see also id. at 18 n.18 (“Indeed, one way to
conceptualize the emergency aid situation is that the basic requirement that the police have
an objectively reasonable belief—i.e., probable cause—does not change, but the object of
the probable cause does change. Rather than requiring an objectively reasonable basis for
an officer to believe a crime has been or is about to occur, the officer needs an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency need for assistance exists.”).
42. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.

624

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 52:3

than probable cause. In Payton v. New York, for example, in the
course of holding that the police must obtain a warrant to make an
in-home arrest, the Court observed that an arrest warrant allows
entry into the home “when there is reason to believe the suspect is
43
within.” Although some Justices have interpreted this language as
44
equivalent to a probable cause requirement, the Payton majority
likely intended to endorse some lesser standard of proof because it
expressly rejected the need for “a search warrant based on proba45
ble cause to believe the suspect is at home.” In fact, the lower
courts have most often read the Payton standard as a “unique for46
mulation” somewhat lower than probable cause.
Likewise, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court extended the warrant exception for searches incident to the arrest of a vehicle’s occupants
to situations where “it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
47
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” The Court did
not further clarify this standard or discuss its relationship to probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Presumably, however, the Justices did not intend to require probable cause, which would independently entitle the police to search the vehicle under the
48
automobile exception. Accordingly, a number of lower courts
have interpreted Gant’s “reasonable to believe” language to require
49
only reasonable suspicion.
Although there are justifications for inferring that the Court did
not mean to require probable cause in Payton and Gant, no similar
reasoning applies in the context of exigent circumstances. As noted above, exigency has not generally been considered an exception
to the probable cause requirement. And, in contrast to Payton and
Gant, there is no basis for assuming the Court tacitly intended to
deviate from that tradition where its exigent circumstances opinions have used terms like “reasonable belief” without specifically
endorsing a reasonable suspicion standard.
Adding to the uncertainty created by the appearance of phrases
such as “reasonable belief” and “reason to believe” untethered to
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court has on
other occasions specifically equated these terms both with reason43. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980).
44. See id. at 616 n.13 (White, J., dissenting); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 341
n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602.
46. Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV.
299, 363 (2002); see also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.1(a), at 354–55 (citing conflicting cases).
47. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
48. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.1(d), at 711.
49. See id. at 712 n.202 (citing cases).
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able suspicion and with probable cause. 50 In fact, before the Court
created the stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement in
Terry v. Ohio, the terms “probable cause,” “reasonable suspicion,”
“reasonable cause,” and “reasonable belief” had roughly the same
51
connotation and were used interchangeably.
Linguistically, phrases such as “reasonable belief” seem more
closely aligned with reasonable suspicion, and in fact, in Terry itself,
the Court noted that an officer who has “reason to believe” a suspect is armed and dangerous may conduct a frisk, “regardless of
52
whether he has probable cause to arrest.” In addition, the Court
used the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” in finding that
53
reasonable suspicion existed on the facts of Terry. Similarly, the
Court later characterized Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce as requiring “reasonable grounds to
54
believe” a suspect is armed and dangerous.
By contrast, the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” is “often
55
interpreted as a synonym for ‘probable cause,’” and other Supreme Court opinions have associated the term with that higher
standard of proof. In Maryland v. Pringle, for example, the Court
observed that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable
56
cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Similarly, Illinois
v. Gates, in describing the probable cause determination made in

50. See generally Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 649–57 (2009) (tracing the Court’s use of the terms “probable cause,”
“reasonable suspicion,” and “reasonable belief” and the Justices’ reliance on their probable
cause precedents in analyzing reasonable suspicion and vice versa).
51. See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois
v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 479–95 (1984); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of
Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 979–80 (2003); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *292 (using the term “probable suspicion” to describe the showing needed
to arrest).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also id. (noting that “the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger”); cf. id. at 30 (using the phrase “reasonably to conclude”
in summarizing the reasonable suspicion standard).
53. Id. at 30.
54. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); see id. at 880 (summarizing Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard with the term “reasonably believed”); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (using the terms “reasonable . . . to believe” and
“reason to believe” in finding a sufficient showing of reasonable suspicion there); cf. Heien
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (using the phrase “reasonable to think” in concluding reasonable suspicion existed in that case); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277
(2002) (using the term “reasonable . . . to infer” in determining that the officer had reasonable suspicion there).
55. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.1(d), at 711.
56. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
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Ker v. California, noted that the police had “a reasonable belief . . .
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana.” 57
The Supreme Court decisions in cases involving exigent circumstances are no exception to the general confusion that surrounds
the Court’s use of terms like “reasonable to believe.” While some of
the opinions described above in Part I, such as Brigham City v. Stuart, used this language without providing any definition or con58
text, others included it when the Justices clearly intended to refer
both to probable cause and reasonable suspicion. In finding that
the police did not have the probable cause necessary to justify the
use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner, the Court concluded that
the officer “could not reasonably have believed that Garner—
59
young, slight, and unarmed—posed any threat.” But the Court’s
opinion in Maryland v. Buie later used similar language to define
the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct a protective sweep,
describing the standard as requiring “‘a reasonable belief’ . . . that
the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the of60
ficer or others.”
Ideally, the Court should be more precise in its choice of language. Although it is perhaps understandable that synonyms such
as “reasonable to believe” or “reasonable to conclude” appear in
opinions analyzing both probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
the Court should avoid using those terms without first tying them
specifically to either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Where the Court has not done so, however, the fluctuations in
meaning the Justices have given this language do not mandate an
assumption that the Court tacitly intended to adopt a standard
lower than probable cause.

57. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 n.7 (1983) (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 36 (1963) (plurality opinion)); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587,
588 (2018) (using the terms “reason to believe” and “a reasonable officer could conclude” in
finding probable cause to arrest existed there); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305,
302 (1999) (refusing to require that police have “positive reason to believe” evidence may be
in the possession of a passenger, in rejecting the contention that the automobile exception
requires “a showing of individualized probable cause” for each container inspected); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (noting that “[t]he cases construing the Fourth
Amendment . . . reflect the ancient common-law rule” permitting the police to make a warrantless arrest based on “reasonable ground for making the arrest”); Ker, 374 U.S. at 37, 40
n.12 (using the phrases “a reasonable ground for the officers’ belief” and “reason to believe”
in describing probable cause); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1975) (observing that an arrest is justified based on “reasonable cause to believe” the suspect committed a crime).
58. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006); see supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
59. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985).
60. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049–50 (1983)); see also id. at 337.
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Moreover, there is no justification for creating a third amorphous “reasonable belief” standard of proof in exigent circumstances cases, as some lower courts have done, either between
probable cause and reasonable suspicion or more forgiving than
61
reasonable suspicion. The first approach is too confusing. Distinguishing between the so-called “common-sense” concepts of prob62
able cause and reasonable suspicion is challenging enough. The
63
Court has associated probable cause with a “substantial chance”
64
and reasonable suspicion with “a moderate chance.” It has also
offered the unhelpful observation that reasonable suspicion is “ob65
viously less demanding” than probable cause. But otherwise, the
Court has steadfastly resisted “[a]rticulating” the two standards
66
“precisely” on the ground that they are “not readily . . . reduced
67
to a neat set of legal rules.” Adding a third standard of suspicion
somewhere between probable cause and reasonable suspicion
would only exacerbate the line-drawing difficulties that already exist.
And the second approach—creating an even less rigorous standard than reasonable suspicion—is dangerous. If law enforcement
officials cannot even supply some “articulable” suspicion, if they
have only an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’”
they have no justification for conducting a warrantless exigent cir68
cumstances search or seizure.
Given the long line of Supreme Court opinions that have included terms such as “reason to believe” in defining both probable
cause and reasonable suspicion, there is no justification for presuming that the Court’s use of similar language in its exigent circumstances opinions was meant to silently signal a retreat from the
traditional probable cause requirement. As detailed in the following Part, therefore, a full search under the exigent circumstances
exception should be permissible only if the police have probable
cause both to enter and to believe an exigency exists.
61. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
62. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (defining probable cause); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (defining reasonable suspicion).
63. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13; see also id. at 238 (defining probable cause as “a fair
probability”).
64. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009); see also United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that reasonable suspicion requires “considerably less” than a preponderance of the evidence).
65. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (observing
that reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding standard” than probable cause in terms of the
“quantity or content” of information necessary as well as the “quality” or “reliability” of that
information).
66. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
67. Id. at 695–96 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
68. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
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III. THE WAY OUT OF THE CONFLICT
To clarify the ambiguity surrounding the term “reason to believe” and resolve the conflict generated by the Supreme Court’s
differing descriptions of the requisite standard of exigency, courts
should ask law enforcement officials to satisfy three requirements
before they may rely on the exigent circumstances warrant exception. First, there is no reason to deviate from the Supreme Court’s
traditional mandate that police must have probable cause to enter
the property in every exigent circumstances case. A second layer of
probable cause—probable cause with regard to the exigency in
question—should also be necessary for any full search. Reasonable
suspicion of exigency should suffice only to support a less intrusive
search: a protective sweep, a no-knock entry, or an impoundment
of the premises while the police seek a warrant. Third, when police
purportedly conduct a search or seizure in the interest of some
non-law-enforcement concern—to render emergency aid or safeguard someone’s property—their primary motivation must be to
serve that non-law-enforcement interest and not to investigate a
crime. Each of these three requirements is discussed separately below.
A. Probable Cause to Enter
The Court has long made clear that exigent circumstances are
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement but
not the probable cause requirement. As the Court explained in
Kirk v. Louisiana, “police officers need either a warrant or probable
cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry
69
into a home.” Therefore, the exigent circumstances exception
does not justify a warrantless intrusion unless the police have probable cause to enter the property, that is, probable cause to believe
that a certain individual or piece of property can be found on the
premises.
The Court has not relaxed this probable cause requirement even
in exigent circumstances cases involving less invasive intrusions. In
its two opinions allowing the police to secure the premises while
they sought a search warrant, for example, the Court made clear
that the officers in both cases had probable cause to believe that

69. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 (1990); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); 1
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 180.
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evidence of a crime could be found on the property. 70 Likewise, in
allowing protective sweeps in Maryland v. Buie, the Court observed
that the police had an arrest warrant in that case, as well as proba71
ble cause to believe Buie was home.
Nevertheless, some view the Court’s decision in Brigham City v.
Stuart as silently moving away from this probable cause requirement, at least in cases involving emergency aid. In Brigham City, law
enforcement officials made a warrantless entry into a home to assist
four adults who were “attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a
72
juvenile” who had hit one of the adults in the face. Although, as
73
discussed below, the focus of the opinion was on the relevance of
the officers’ subjective reasons for entering, the Court, in upholding the officers’ actions, explained that they had “an objectively
reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might
need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just begin74
ning.”
Reasoning that the Supreme Court “failed to conduct any traditional probable cause inquiry” in Brigham City, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Court’s opinion as “assum[ing]” that probable cause
to enter the home “exists whenever law enforcement officers have
an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that an emergency is
75
unfolding in that place.” Some scholars likewise accuse the Court
of “abandon[ing] the probable cause requirement” in Brigham
76
City.
But this argument conflates the two different concepts of probable cause at work in exigent circumstances cases: whether the police have probable cause to enter the premises, and whether they

70. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (listing the presence of probable
cause as the first of four “circumstances, which . . . consider[ed] in combination,” supported
the constitutionality of the impoundment); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810
(1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (permitting “securing a dwelling,
on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a
search warrant is being sought”); id. at 824 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that impoundment would have been permissible from the outside in that case).
71. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
72. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401 (2006).
73. See infra notes 125–37 and accompanying text.
74. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
75. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). For other courts taking
this view, see United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006), and State v. Meeks,
262 S.W.3d 710, 726 n.31 (Tenn. 2008).
76. Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 778 (2007); see also Bruce A.
Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 575 (2007) (charging that “a
once-traditional part of the exigent circumstances equation becomes quite conspicuous by
its absence in the opinion”); cf. Marinos, supra note 31, at 283 (viewing the probable cause
requirement as an open question after Brigham City, at least where police enter a home in a
non-emergency, community caretaking context).
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have probable cause to believe an exigency exists. In destruction of
evidence cases, these two inquiries are clearly distinct. Probable
cause to believe evidence of a crime can be found in a particular
location does not necessarily translate into probable cause to believe the evidence will disappear in the time it would take to obtain
a warrant. In emergency aid cases, the two inquiries may flow more
easily from one another. When the police see someone inside a
burning building, for example, they have probable cause to enter
as well as probable cause to believe an exigency exists. But the two
probable cause requirements are not “superfluous,” as the Ninth
77
Circuit suggested, and Brigham City’s use of the undefined term
“reasonable basis for believing” in defining the quantum of suspicion of exigency necessary in an emergency aid case does not support relaxing the traditional requirement that all exigent circum78
stances searches require probable cause to enter.
Moreover, the most likely explanation for the Court’s failure to
specifically address probable cause in its opinion in Brigham City
was that it was obvious the police did have probable cause to enter
there. The officers initially went to the house in response to a noise
complaint, and, when they arrived, they could hear “shouting from
79
inside,” corroborating the call they had received. Walking up the
driveway “to investigate,” they saw “two juveniles drinking beer in
the backyard,” giving rise to probable cause to believe the crime of
80
underage drinking was in progress. At that point, the police went
into the backyard and were able to see the “altercation taking place
81
in the kitchen.” The officers’ personal observation of the scuffle
“through a screen door and windows” clearly gave them probable
82
cause to enter.

77. Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952.
78. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
79. Id. at 401.
80. Id.; cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 n.4 (2013) (holding that police do not conduct a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes when they “approach the home in order to
speak with the occupant, because all are invited to do that,” but their actions do constitute a
search if they enter “in order to do nothing but conduct a search” (emphasis omitted));
Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 509 (Utah 2005) (noting that the trial court found as a
matter of fact that “the officers, from their observations from the front of the residence, determined that it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have done no good,”
and therefore “[i]t was appropriate that they proceed down the driveway alongside the
house to further investigate” (quoting the trial court order)), rev’d, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
81. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400.
82. Id.; see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 3.5(a), at 331–32 (observing that courts assessing
probable cause “generally presume[]” police officers “to be reliable”). But cf. Bascuas, supra
note 76, at 779 (asserting, without citation or explanation, that “the police may have learned
of the brawl only by trespassing” because they “saw the fight only after entering into the
backyard and peering into a window”).
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In fact, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the existence
83
of probable cause was “unchallenged” and therefore “not at issue”
84
in Brigham City. As a result, it was not surprising that the Supreme
Court did not devote substantial attention to the question of probable cause. But the issue did not go unmentioned. In the Supreme
Court’s single reference to probable cause, the Justices seemingly
endorsed the state supreme court’s conclusion that probable cause
to enter is a prerequisite for the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement: “This exception applies, the [state supreme]
court explained, where police have probable cause and where ‘a reasonable person [would] believe that the entry was necessary to pre85
vent physical harm to the officers or other persons.’”
Accordingly, the view that Brigham City silently signaled the
Court’s intent to depart from tradition and allow exigent circumstances searches unsupported by probable cause to enter is not a
plausible reading of the opinion. As a result, all exigent circumstances searches—no matter how great or small the intrusion involved—should require probable cause to believe a particular person or property can be found on the premises.
B. Probable Cause of Exigency
The entry and search of premises under the exigent circumstances exception should require probable cause not only to enter,
but also to believe that exigent circumstances exist—that is, probable cause that “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objec86
tively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Before they
conduct a full search, therefore, the police should have probable
cause to believe that a warrantless entry is necessary to prevent the
83. Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 509–10 (listing the existence of “‘probable cause . . . to
enter into the backyard’” as one of the trial judge’s “findings of fact,” noting that the appellate court “determined that Brigham City had not challenged the trial court’s findings of
fact,” and limiting “[o]ur review . . . to the correctness of the legal conclusion . . . that no
exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry into the home” because “[t]he accuracy of
the subsidiary facts relied upon by the court of appeals was unchallenged” (quoting the trial
court order)).
84. Id. at 511 (“Here, the officers’ observation of the consumption of alcohol by underage youths and the blow struck by the juvenile in the kitchen of the dwelling were sufficient
to establish probable cause and thus are not at issue. Brigham City instead challenges the
court of appeals’s determination that exigent circumstances did not exist.”).
85. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 402 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 514); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 05-502) (Justice Ginsburg notes that the officers
“checked to . . . determine that there was probable cause to enter”).
86. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
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imminent destruction of evidence,87 the imminent escape of a suspect, or imminent injury to the officers or some member of the
88
public.
Reasonable suspicion of exigency should justify only a less invasive Fourth Amendment intrusion. Thus, the Court’s rulings allow89
ing police to conduct a protective sweep or make a no-knock en90
try based on reasonable suspicion are justifiable. A protective
sweep is not “a full search of the premises,” but instead allows only
“a cursory inspection” of places where persons posing a danger to
91
the police might be found. And a no-knock entry allows law enforcement officials to enter without announcing their presence
when they already have a warrant or some other justification for be92
ing on the property. Similarly, although the Court has not identified the precise showing necessary to allow the police to secure the
93
premises while they seek a search warrant, an impoundment is “a
significantly less restrictive restraint” than an arrest or search and
should likewise be permitted based on reasonable suspicion that
allowing the residents unrestrained access to their home would, for
94
example, lead to the destruction of evidence. For a full search,
87. This is not to suggest that such entries are permissible in cases involving minor offenses. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (refusing to permit a warrantless
entry to preserve evidence of “a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible”).
88. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (noting that exigent circumstances “include the need to pursue a fleeing suspect, protect individuals who
are threatened with imminent harm, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence”);
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (same).
89. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990) (described supra notes 19–20 and
accompanying text).
90. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (described supra notes 21–22
and accompanying text).
91. Buie, 494 U.S. at 335. The Court also emphasized in Buie that the police were already lawfully in the house: “[p]ossessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe
Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the
house in which Buie might be found.” Id. at 332–33. Nevertheless, some lower courts have
extended Buie and allow the police to enter in order to conduct a protective sweep. Compare
United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing such an entry), with
United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1181 (11th Cir. 2013) (taking the contrary position). See generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.4(c), at 504–08.
92. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5 (characterizing a no-knock entry as “less intrusive
than . . . a warrantless search”).
93. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001) (using the undefined term “reasonably believed”) (described supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text).
94. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332; see also id. at 336 (observing that “[t]emporarily keeping a
person from entering his home” is “a consequence whenever police stop a person on the
street”); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O’Connor, J.) (describing an impoundment as “a seizure” that, unlike a search, “affects only
possessory interests, not privacy interests”); cf. Sonntag, supra note 31, at 635–38 (likewise
distinguishing protective sweeps, no-knock entries, and impoundments, though assuming
that the Supreme Court has clearly required only reasonable suspicion in all three cases).
This is not to say that an impoundment should necessarily be permitted when it intrudes on the interests of innocent persons, an issue the Supreme Court has not addressed.
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however, probable cause of exigency “strikes the appropriate balance” between law enforcement interests and the individual’s pri95
vacy interests. As discussed above, the Court’s use of the undefined term “reasonable basis for believing” in cases like Brigham City
96
v. Stuart does not require a different result.
Nevertheless, one of the early pieces of scholarship to address
the appropriate standard of exigency proposed requiring only reasonable suspicion that evidence would be destroyed in order to
97
trigger the exigent circumstances exception. Rejecting probable
cause as “too rigorous,” the author reasoned that mandating that
“it must be ‘more probable than not’ that an emergency exists”
98
creates an unacceptable “risk . . . that the evidence will be lost.”
But the Court has never defined probable cause literally, that is, as
requiring a likelihood greater than fifty percent. In fact, the Court
99
has repeatedly refused to quantify the concept of probable cause,
and considers the probable cause standard to be met by a showing
of only a “fair probability” or “substantial chance of criminal activi100
ty.”
Several other commentators have advocated imposing different
standards of proof depending on the nature of the exigency involved. These scholars would require police to have probable cause
in destruction of evidence cases but only reasonable suspicion in
101
emergency aid and/or community caretaking cases.

See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328 (noting that the police had probable cause that the individual
affected by the impoundment “had hidden marijuana in his home”); Segura, 468 U.S. at 813
(opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J.) (pointing out that the apartment’s residents were under arrest, so that “[t]he actual interference with their possessory interests”
was “virtually nonexistent”).
95. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
96. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006); see supra notes 23–24 & 39–68 accompanying text.
97. See Salken, supra note 31, at 325; cf. Sonntag, supra note 31, at 651 (proposing that
“probable cause . . . based on articulable facts” be required in destruction of evidence cases).
98. Salken, supra note 31, at 327 n.205.
99. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (observing that probable cause is
“incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages”); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (admonishing that “[f]inely tuned standards such as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no
place” in assessing probable cause).
100. Gates, 426 U.S. at 238, 244 n.13.
101. See Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine, supra note 34, at 62; Stamm, supra note 31, at
1447–48; Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Thoughts on Kentucky v. King, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 17,
2011,
2:31
PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/thoughts-onkentucky-v-king.html; cf. Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts
Should Embrace the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BOALT J. CRIM.
L. 3, ¶ 33 (2005) (proposing that an evaluation of probable cause be restricted to criminal
investigations, and “a reasonableness standard” be applied to community caretaking searches); John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 438–40 (1999) (likewise rejecting a probable
cause standard for community caretaking and emergency aid searches, and instead suggest-
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One justification offered for this distinction is that police actions
in the latter circumstances do not rise to the level of “searches” and
102
“seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But
police conduct that does not constitute a search or a seizure is not
governed by the Fourth Amendment at all and therefore should
not require probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any particular
103
quantum of proof.
Moreover, characterizing emergency aid intrusions as neither
searches nor seizures is problematic. Certainly, the Court has made
clear that police may approach an individual in public and ask a
104
few questions without conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure.
But any situation in which the reasonable person would not “feel
free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the en105
counter” does effect a Fourth Amendment seizure—regardless of
whether the officer wants to ask “May I search your bag?” or “Are
106
you in distress and in need of help?”
Likewise, once the police have violated a reasonable expectation
107
of privacy, they have conducted a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes irrespective of whether they are acting to uncover
108
evidence of a crime or to promote some other social good. The
Court has made that clear when addressing the permissibility of
administrative searches. As the Court pointed out in discussing
housing code inspections in Camara v. Municipal Court, it would
“surely [be] anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when
109
the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”

ing that those searches be justified based on “an objectionably reasonable basis for a belief
in the immediate need for police assistance”).
102. See Decker, supra note 101, at 439; see also Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism:
Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1485, 1495 n.40 (2009) (citing cases taking this position).
103. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (noting that an “encounter
[which] is consensual” and does not constitute a “seizure” “will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny” and “no reasonable suspicion is required”); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974) (pointing out that “[l]aw enforcement practices are not required by the fourth amendment to be reasonable unless they
are either ‘searches’ or ‘seizures’”). See generally 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3,
§ 6.01[A], at 67–68; 1 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 2.1, at 562.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
105. Id. at 202 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
106. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 102, at 1497–98.
107. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
108. See, e.g., 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.6, at 595 n.1; Dimino, supra note 102, at 1497.
109. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (concluding that drug testing railroad employees in the
interest of public safety rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment search); Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (rejecting the position that entries “to ascertain the cause of a fire
rather than to look for evidence of a crime” do not constitute searches under the Fourth
Amendment).
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A second justification proffered for allowing emergency aid
and/or community caretaking searches on a lesser showing of exigency is that destruction of evidence cases differ from situations
110
“when lives (and limbs) are at stake.” Although a great deal of
controversy surrounds the relationship among the concepts of exigent circumstances, emergency aid, and community caretaking—
111
112
whether they are three (or two) separate exceptions to the warrant requirement or they all fit within the umbrella of the exigent
113
circumstances exception —the Court has wisely chosen not to differentiate among them. In Kentucky v. King, for example, the Court
noted that exigency is “[o]ne well-recognized exception” to the
warrant requirement and then listed the preservation of evidence,
hot pursuit, and emergency aid as the “several exigencies” the
114
Court has recognized.
110. Bradley, Sensible Emergency Doctrine, supra note 34, at 62; see also Stamm, supra note
31, at 1447 (arguing that “no imminent danger to officers or the public” is involved in a destruction of evidence case).
111. Those subscribing to this view generally take the position that exigent circumstances searches are aimed at serving law enforcement goals and that community caretaking
searches require less exigency than emergency aid searches. See, e.g., Sutterfield v. City of
Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 559–61 (7th Cir. 2014); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 141 &
n.3 (Iowa 1996); State v. Neighbors, 328 P.3d 1081, 1086, 1091 (Kan. 2014); State v. Pinkard,
785 N.W.2d 592, 600 & n.8, 605 n.13 (Wis. 2010); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.6(a), at 596
n.7; Bell, supra note 101, ¶¶ 8, 12, 20; Gregory T. Helding, Comment, Stop Hammering Fourth
Amendment Rights: Reshaping the Community Caretaking Exception with the Physical Intrusion
Standard, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 136, 152–53 (2013).
In addition, some courts and commentators, relying on references in the Supreme
Court’s first community caretaking opinion, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973), to
“[t]he constitutional difference” between searching automobiles and searching “houses and
similar structures,” refuse to permit community caretaking searches of homes. See, e.g., Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 555–57 (citing conflicting cases); Neighbors, 328 P.3d at 1089 (citing cases
taking this position); Helding, supra, at 162; Marinos, supra note 31, at 293. For the contrary
position, see, for example, Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 597–601; David Fox, Note, The Community
Caretaking Exception: How the Courts Can Allow the Police to Keep Us Safe Without Opening the
Floodgates to Abuse, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 407, 421 (2018). Cady v. Dombrowski is also discussed infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
112. For the view that emergency aid and community caretaking constitute one category,
see, for example, United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); State v.
Fausel, 993 A.2d 455, 465–66 (Conn. 2010); People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 177 n.20,
185–86 (Mich. 2011); State v. Ryon, 108 P.3d 1032, 1042-43, 1043 n.4 (N.M. 2005); 1
DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 180; Decker, supra note 101, at 443–44; Fox,
supra note 111, at 419–21; Mary Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine:
Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 329, 331–32 (1999). Cf.
Stamm, supra note 31, at 1431 (separating “public-safety” and “evidence-gathering” exigencies, though not discussing community caretaking).
For the view that emergency aid and exigent circumstances constitute one category,
see, for example, United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334–37 (11th Cir. 2002) (equating emergency aid and exigency, though not discussing community caretaking); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 472 n.3, 472-73 (Mass. 2014); Dimino, supra note 102, at
1507–09; Marinos, supra note 31, at 282–83.
113. See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 723 & n.16 (Tenn. 2008).
114. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2222–23 (2018) (quoting King with approval); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403 (2006) (citing precedents authorizing warrantless exigent circumstances searches and
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At some level, all police work is designed to promote the public
safety, whether officers are rescuing someone from a burning
building, protecting the community from the risks associated with
the escape of a dangerous criminal, or ensuring that prosecutors
115
have the evidence they need to secure convictions. As a result,
the purported differences among the various categories of exigen116
cy easily break down. Police who make a warrantless entry to rescue a kidnapped child or to stop an assault or burglary in progress
are obviously protecting the safety of the victims, but they are also
117
investigating a crime. And it is not obvious why a more lenient
standard of exigency should apply in a case like Brigham City, where
law enforcement officials were trying to help four adults restrain an
118
out-of-control minor, than where police officers make a warrantless entry to prevent a serial killer from destroying evidence of a
119
homicide.
Language in Maryland v. Buie contrasting searches to uncover evidence with searches to protect police officers does not call for a
120
different conclusion. The Court’s opinion in that case did point
out in a footnote that a protective sweep, like a Terry stop-and-frisk,

then noting, “[o]ne exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist
persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury”); Schmerber v. California
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (using the term “emergency” in discussing the destruction of evidence); see also Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 723 n.16 (observing that Brigham City “embedded the
emergency aid exception deep within the exigent circumstances exception”); Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 812–13 (2007) (pointing out that Brigham City
“goes a considerable way toward collapsing any distinction” between emergency aid and exigent circumstances searches, “at least in the significant subset of cases where exigency derives from the risk of physical harm to a person”). But see Marinos, supra note 31, at 282–83
(rejecting this view of Brigham City).
115. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 102, at 1493; cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 84 (2001) (emphasizing the need to analyze the “immediate” rather than the “ultimate . . . purpose” of an administrative search because “law enforcement involvement always
serves some broader social purpose or objective”).
116. See, e.g., 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 11.01, at 181. Compare Decker, supra note 101, at 511 (treating entries both to apprehend a fleeing suspect and to prevent the
destruction of evidence as “crime solving” searches), with Stamm, supra note 31, at 1431
(categorizing the prevention of flight as an emergency aid search).
117. See Decker, supra note 101, at 470–73, 479–90, 490–94 (listing these as examples of
permissible emergency aid searches).
118. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 401.
119. Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
41, at 12 (criticizing the approach of “artificially dichotomizing emergencies” as “rarely fruitful (but invariably litigation-generating)”); Tuerkheimer, supra note 114, at 813 n.64 (“question[ing] . . . whether judicial application of an ‘exigent circumstances’ versus an ‘emergency aid’ framework has practical consequences,” noting that “the imposition of an ‘exigent
circumstances’ exception versus an ‘emergency exception’ rubric has not generally dictated
outcomes” in courts’ decisions).
120. But cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 40, at 18 n.2 (citing Buie in arguing that
“[t]he reasonable suspicion standard for emergency aid intrusions is consistent with the
standard applied by this Court to other exigent circumstances that are justified by the need
to protect the safety of officers or others”).
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is distinguishable from a “search[] for evidence plain and simple”
and is justifiable on a showing of only reasonable suspicion because
it is “limited to what is necessary to protect the safety of officers
121
and others.” But the Court’s focus was on the invasiveness, rather
than the purpose, of the intrusion, and the Court then went on to
differentiate a protective sweep from a search incident to arrest—
which is designed to protect both the officer and the evidence (as
122
well as to prevent flight) —because of “the more limited intrusion
123
contemplated by a protective sweep.” Buie therefore does not
support requiring less than probable cause of exigency when, instead of a cursory sweep, the police engage in a “‘top-to-bottom’
search” under the exigent circumstances exception, even in the in124
terest of promoting safety concerns.
Rather, as Buie suggests, the quantum of suspicion necessary for
a warrantless exigent circumstances search or seizure should hinge
on the nature of the intrusion and not the type of exigency involved. Probable cause to believe exigent circumstances exist
should be required before police use deadly force to apprehend a
suspect or conduct a full search, whether the search is intended to
prevent the destruction of evidence or to provide emergency aid.
Reasonable suspicion of exigency should justify only less invasive
exigent circumstances intrusions—protective sweeps, no-knock entries, and impoundments.
It remains to consider whether the constitutionality of the different varieties of exigent circumstances searches should turn on
the police officer’s reasons for entering. That issue is the subject of
the next section.
C. Subjective Motivation for Entering
Although the first two elements of the approach endorsed in this
Article do not deviate from Supreme Court precedent, that is not
true of the third and final element. In arguing that entries purportedly justified by the need to provide emergency aid or serve
some other non-law-enforcement concern should be permissible
only if the officers’ primary reason for entering was actually to offer
assistance, this Article maintains that the Court’s decision to the
125
contrary in Brigham City v. Stuart was incorrect.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335 n.3 (1990).
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
Buie, 494 U.S. at 336.
Id.
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05 (2006).
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What Brigham City failed to recognize is that this subset of exigent circumstances searches are essentially administrative, or “special needs,” searches. Just as administrative inspections are regulatory searches that have a “primary purpose” distinct from “the
126
general interest in crime control” —i.e., that serve “special needs,
127
beyond the normal need for law enforcement” —non-lawenforcement exigent circumstances searches aim to protect someone’s person or property rather than uncover evidence of a crime.
As a result, consistency with the Court’s administrative inspection
precedents calls for an evaluation of the officers’ subjective motives
to ensure that these emergency aid/community caretaking search128
es are not pretextual investigatory searches. Requiring a proper

126. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
127. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment), quoted in Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002). For criticism of the
Court’s distinction between special needs and criminal law enforcement, see, for example,
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977,
1025 (calling the line “illusory” and “unwise”); David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for
Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1126 (2013) (finding it
“a little odd to consider motive . . . when non-law enforcement interests alone are pursued,
but not when both law enforcement and non-law enforcement interests reinforce each other”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989
SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89 (referring to the distinction as “chimerical and irrelevant”). But cf. Scott
E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and
General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 551 (2004) (linking the Court’s decision to take on a “judicial oversight” “role as an active ‘policy magistrate’” in these cases to “the concerns over
general warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment”).
128. For others endorsing a subjective requirement in at least some exigent circumstances cases, see Bell, supra note 101, ¶ 33 (proposing that courts analyzing community
caretaking searches “apply a reasonableness standard, coupled with [a] good faith requirement”); Bradley, Reasonable Policeman, supra note 34, at 371–72 (agreeing with Brigham City
that motivation is irrelevant when “police are acting for the protection of themselves or others,” but arguing that “an actual belief” of exigency is necessary in hot pursuit and destruction of evidence cases); Decker, supra note 101, at 532 (advocating that officers performing
community caretaking and emergency aid searches must be acting, “at least in part, on a
subjective motivation to aid or protect life or property” and must also “reasonably believe”
their assistance is “needed immediately”); Dimino, supra note 102, at 1529 (recommending
that community caretaking searches include both a subjective and an objective component,
i.e., that the officer “subjectively held a belief that was objectively reasonable”); Edward G.
Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1973) (maintaining that police conducting emergency assistance searches must “not enter with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search” and
must also have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an urgent need for such assistance”); Fox, supra note 111, at 435 (suggesting that an officer’s “subjective motivations” be
considered in evaluating community caretaking searches of a home but that “the plain view
doctrine . . . be suspended” in such cases); Mark Goreczny, Note, Taking Care While Doing
Right by the Fourth Amendment: A Pragmatic Approach to the Community Caretaker Exception, 14
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 229, 250, 257–58 (2015) (proposing that community
caretaking searches require “reasonable grounds to believe” in the need for assistance, as
well as proof that the police were not “primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence,” and that only “evidence found in plain view, related to the community caretaking
reason for entry” of a home, be admissible); Naumann, supra note 112, at 364 (advocating
that courts evaluate both “objective and subjective reasonableness” in community caretaking
cases); Mannheimer, supra note 101 (endorsing a standard of reasonable suspicion plus mo-
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purpose is especially critical if courts reject the twin probable cause
requirements proposed in this Article and impose a lower standard
of proof for those exigent circumstances searches that serve non129
law-enforcement interests.
The Court’s opinion in Brigham City did not focus on the quantum of evidence needed to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, but instead on the relevance
of a police officer’s underlying purpose when conducting an
emergency aid search. Relying on Fourth Amendment precedent
that refused to consider law enforcement officials’ “subjective mo130
the Court concluded that “[i]t . . . does not mattivation,”
ter . . . whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and
131
prevent further violence.”
The Court acknowledged, however, that its previous opinions in
the area of administrative inspections have analyzed “programmatic

tive to assist for community caretaking searches). But cf. Marinos, supra note 31, at 287 (recommending that a non-emergency community caretaking search of a home require “an objective determination that a criminal investigation will not be part of the particular search”
rather than consideration of the searching officers’ actual subjective motivation). For a lower court opinion requiring proof of purpose in emergency aid cases despite the Court’s
holding in Brigham City, see People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 179–82, 179 n.28 (Mich.
2011) (relying on Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 143–45, and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), discussed infra text accompanying notes 157–61). See generally George E. Dix, Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373, 477, 479 (2006) (arguing broadly that Fourth
Amendment intrusions should be deemed reasonable only if the “general legal theories”
used to justify the police conduct “were actually and subjectively within the analysis engaged
in by the officers in deciding to take that action,” unless the prosecution can show some alternative justification that the officers “would have considered . . . and acted in reliance on”
had they “not proceeded on the legal conclusion they actually relied upon”).
129. For courts taking this position, see supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
130. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404. For discussion of the Supreme Court’s inconsistent
use of subjective versus objective police officer standards in its Fourth Amendment decisions, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 78–
88 (2007).
131. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per
curiam) (relying on Brigham City in holding that the constitutionality of an emergency aid
search does not depend on whether the officer “subjectively believe[d]” that someone in the
house was “seriously injured”); cf. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 302 (2014) (citing
Brigham City to support the proposition that the permissibility of removing a cotenant who
objects to a consent search in, for example, cases of suspected domestic violence does not
turn on “the subjective intent” of the officers but rather on whether “the removal of the potential objector is objectively reasonable”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (citing Brigham City and Fisher in rejecting the view that the exigent circumstances exception is
unavailable if the police “deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith
intent to avoid the warrant requirement” (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649,
656 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 563 U.S. 452 (2011))). But cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by
O’Connor, J.) (noting, in approving the duration of a nineteen-hour impoundment of an
apartment, that there was “no suggestion that the officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed
obtaining the warrant”).
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purpose.” 132 The Supreme Court has generally upheld the constitutionality of administrative search schemes only if, in addition to including some mechanism to limit the discretion of the individual
133
inspectors, the searches are “designed to serve ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,’” rather than pre134
textual searches for evidence. Thus, Brigham City cited, for example, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, which struck down a drug
checkpoint because—unlike a sobriety checkpoint based on
135
“highway safety concern[s]” —“the primary purpose” of the narcotics checkpoint was “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
136
wrongdoing.” Likewise, the Court invalidated a public hospital’s

132. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
46 (2000)).
133. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658, 659 n.18, 661 (1979) (though recognizing that the state’s “vital interest” in highway safety was “distinguishable from the general
interest in crime control,” the Court went on to require some method of constraining “the
unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials”). But cf. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 279 (2011) (“document[ing] the dilution of protections against arbitrariness within administrative search doctrine”).
The Court’s opinions have fluctuated between treating discretion minimization as a
separate hurdle that an administrative inspection must clear and considering it as one of the
factors used in determining whether the inspection survives a balancing test that “weigh[s]
the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against the ‘special needs’ that support[]” the search. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). For cases taking
the former approach, see, for example, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452
(2015) (observing that, “in order for an administrative search to be constitutional, the subject of the search must be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a
neutral decisionmaker” to protect against pretextual searches); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691, 703 (1987) (holding that the constitutionality of an administrative inspection turns on
“‘a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant’” that “limit[s] the discretion of the
inspecting officers” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602–03 (1980))); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 n.6, 376 n.7 (1987) (pointing out that “[o]ur decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according to standardized
criteria” to “circumscribe the discretion of individual officers”); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (noting, in requiring reasonable suspicion for a highway safety traffic stop, that the Court “in
previous [administrative inspection] cases has insisted that the discretion of the official in
the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
532–33, 536–37 (1967) (separately analyzing discretion minimization and the balancing
test). For decisions discussing discretion as one of the relevant factors in applying the balancing test, see, for example, Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–53 (1990)
(reasoning that the lack of discretion given to the officials on the scene minimized the intrusiveness of a DUI checkpoint), and Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665–67 (1989) (rejecting the need for a warrant because no discretion was exercised in determining which employees to drug test).
134. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted in original)). But cf. Brensike Primus, supra note
133, at 257 (charging that “the rules governing administrative searches are notoriously unclear”); Clancy, supra note 127, at 1022 n.298 (calling the Court’s special needs doctrine
“formless,” “more a facade for policy results than an analytical framework supporting reasoned decisionmaking”).
135. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447 (upholding a DUI checkpoint).
136. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 43. The Court left open whether the Indianapolis checkpoint would have been permissible if its “primary purpose” had been “checking licenses or
driver sobriety” with “a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.” Id. at 47 n.2.
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program of drug testing pregnant women because “the immediate
objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes,” and therefore the program “simply [did] not fit
137
within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”
Despite Brigham City’s emphasis on Edmond’s use of the word
“programmatic,” other Supreme Court opinions evaluating the
constitutionality of administrative searches have in fact been concerned with the motives of the individual who actually conducted
138
the inspection. The Court’s first administrative search decision,
Camara v. Municipal Court, for example, directed that city officials
obtain administrative area warrants for housing inspections lest res139
idents be “subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”
Similarly, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court required reasonable suspicion to support a highway safety automobile stop involving a license and registration check so as to prevent police officers from
140
exercising “standardless and unconstrained discretion.” And in
upholding the administrative search of an automobile junkyard in
New York v. Burger, the Court ruled that the statute authorizing the
inspection “must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers” in
141
order to pass constitutional scrutiny. In addition, the Burger
Court made clear that it found “no reason to believe that the instant
inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence” of a
142
crime.

137. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–84 (emphasis omitted). But cf. Kaye, supra note 127, at 1125
(arguing that both Edmond and Ferguson were “single-motive cases involving single-purpose
programs” and therefore the Court’s “‘primary purpose’ language is dicta”).
138. See generally Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 260–61. Brensike Primus describes,
and criticizes, the Court’s “entanglement” of two different types of inspections into “a single
category” of searches that are “both labeled ‘administrative’”: “dragnet intrusions,” such as
checkpoints and housing inspections, which permit “searches or seizures of every person,
place, or thing in a specific location or involved in a specific activity”; and “special subpopulation searches,” which allow searches of “certain people (or people acting in certain capacities)” based on “individualized suspicion” that does not “rise to the level of probable cause.”
Id.
139. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). For further discussion of the
showing required to obtain these warrants, see infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
140. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
141. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (articulating the requirements necessary for a statute to “provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant” (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981))).
142. Id. at 716 n.27 (emphasis added); see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct.
2443, 2452–53 (2015) (requiring “an opportunity for precompliance review” before police
may view a hotel registry so as to prevent the “intolerable risk” that these administrative
searches can be “used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests”); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761 (2010) (concluding that the search of a municipal employee’s
text messages was based on a permissible “‘noninvestigatory work-related purpose”‘ given
the specific reasons why the chief of police “ordered the search” (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (plurality opinion))); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (holding that reasonable suspicion is needed to stop vehicles close to
the border to check for undocumented immigrants in order to ensure that the people living
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Perhaps most on point, the Court’s opinion in Michigan v. Tyler
specifically recognized the relevance of an individual inspector’s
motive in “the context of investigatory fire searches,” which, the
Court noted, are “not programmatic but are responsive to individual
143
events.” The Court observed that administrative inspections to
determine the cause of a fire were distinguishable from the “routine building inspections” at issue in Camara, which could be governed by “broad legislative or administrative guidelines specifying
the purpose, frequency, scope, and manner of conducting the in144
spections.” Rather, the permissibility of fire inspections turned
on the motivation of the person conducting the search. An administrative warrant suffices, the Court explained, when “the purpose
of the investigation is to determine the cause and to prevent such
fires from occurring or recurring,” but a traditional search warrant
is required when “the authorities are seeking evidence to be used
145
in a criminal prosecution.”
Thus, while an evaluation of the overall programmatic purpose
of an administrative inspection scheme might be appropriate in
cases involving roadblocks or building inspections—where the protocol for choosing which vehicles to stop and which properties to
search is determined in advance, usually by higher-level supervi146
sors —that approach does not suffice in cases such as Tyler and
Brigham City, where all relevant decisions are necessarily made in
the heat of the moment by the actors conducting the search or sei147
zure. Warrantless entries to provide emergency aid, like entries
in those communities are not subjected to “potentially unlimited interference with their use
of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (requiring probable cause to search a car near the border in order to limit the “unfettered discretion” of Border Patrol agents); Sundby, supra note
127, at 515 (noting that the Court’s “early ‘special need’ cases . . . tended to focus on guarding against ‘standardless and unconstrained discretion’ being granted to the officer in the
field rather than on scrutinizing the policy judgment of the need for the search in the first
place” (quoting Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted in original))).
143. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507 (1978) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 508 (quoting People v. Tyler, 250 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Mich. 1977), aff’d, 436
U.S. 499 (1978)).
146. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453 (observing that the location of the DUI checkpoints was
“selected pursuant to guidelines” created by an Advisory Committee and the police
“stop[ped] every approaching vehicle”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 n.17
(1978) (referring to the safety inspection of a workplace as a search conducted pursuant to a
“general schedule” (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.7, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978) (No. 76-1143))); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (noting that “[t]he location of a fixed [immigration] checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the
field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources”); see also 5 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 10.8(d), at 437–
40 (surveying lower court opinions addressing checkpoints).
147. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (warning that “the purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an
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to investigate the cause of a fire, should be upheld only when “the
officer’s purpose is . . . to attend to the special needs . . . for which
148
the administrative inspection is justified,” and not when the police engage in “searches that are not made for those purposes,”
149
such as searches for evidence. In non-law-enforcement exigent
circumstances cases, therefore, an analysis of the individual officer’s subjective motivation is needed to ensure that the searches
are in fact primarily intended to provide assistance and not to investigate a crime.
In addition to these administrative search precedents, the
Court’s opinions assessing the constitutionality of inventory
150
searches—administrative-like inspections designed to safeguard a
car owner’s property, protect police departments from claims of
151
lost property, and preserve officer and public safety —have expressed concern that the individual officials performing the inventories must not be engaging in pretextual searches for law enforcement purposes. In South Dakota v. Opperman, for example, the
invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene” of the narcotics
checkpoint).
148. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 737 (2011).
149. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
150. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.4(a), at 848 (analogizing inventories to “other types
of inspections or regulatory searches”); cf. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 3, § 15.01[A],
at 237 n.2 (noting that inventory searches “could reasonably fit” under the administrative
search rubric, but developed as an “independent” warrant exception “[l]argely for [the] historical reason[]” that the initial administrative inspection cases “focused on activities of nonpolice officers” (emphasis omitted)); Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 303 (agreeing that
inventory searches are a “special type” of administrative search “[i]n substance,” but arguing
that “the inventory search exception has long been carved off from the larger body of dragnet administrative searches”).
Brensike Primus acknowledges that the Court’s inventory search opinions “sometimes
[make] a passing reference to administrative search cases,” but she concludes that the Court
“does not situate the inventory search exception in . . . its administrative search doctrine.” Id.
at 304. In support of this argument, she correctly points out that the Court has referred to
the inventory search as “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement,” Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987), and that the Court’s initial inventory search opinion
“drew from its cases recognizing . . . the automobile exception” instead of “rely[ing] on its
administrative search precedent.” Brensike Primus, supra, at 303 n.254 (citing South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976)). But Opperman specifically referred to inventory
searches as an exercise of police officers’ “routine administrative caretaking functions.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5. Moreover, while the Court in Opperman did “distinguish[] automobile inspections from administrative search cases,” Brensike Primus, supra, at 304 n.256
(citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2), the cited footnote merely refused to apply Camara’s
warrant requirement to automobile searches. In fact, the footnote implied that inventory
searches are a species of administrative inspection, noting that Camara required a warrant to
search a home “to ascertain health or safety conditions,” but that “this procedure has never been
held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2
(emphasis added). Given the functional similarity between administrative inspections and
inventory searches, it makes sense to include “noncriminal,” “noninvestigative” inventory
searches under the administrative search umbrella. Id. at 370 n.5; see also infra notes 162–63
and accompanying text (explaining the link between inventory and community caretaking
searches).
151. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 376 n.10.
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majority observed that “this Court has consistently sustained police
intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting
152
the car and its contents.” The Court upheld the inventory search
at issue in Opperman, finding “no suggestion whatever” that the
search conducted there was “a pretext concealing an investigatory
153
When the constitutionality of the inventory
police motive.”
search of an impounded automobile next reached the Court in
Colorado v. Bertine, the Court likewise commented that “reasonable
police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in
good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment” and that, on the facts before it, “[t]here was no showing that the police chose to impound
154
Bertine’s van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity.”
And in its most recent discussion of these searches, the Court in
Florida v. Wells summarized its inventory search precedents as “for155
bidding uncanalized discretion to police officers.” Given the language in this line of cases, some lower courts asked to evaluate the
permissibility of an inventory search have properly engaged in an
assessment of the motives of the individual officers who conducted
156
the search.
Not only did the Supreme Court in Brigham City deviate from its
case law governing inventory and other administrative searches,
but it also neglected to even mention the Court’s first community
caretaking opinion, Cady v. Dombrowski, which similarly focused on
157
the searching officer’s “specific motivation” for acting. The Court
in Cady defined “community caretaking functions” as “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence

152. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373; see also id. at 370 n.5 (referring to permissible inventory
searches as “routine, non-criminal procedures” where “no claim is made that the protective
procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations”); id. at 370 n.6 (characterizing inventory searches as occurring in a “benign noncriminal context”).
153. Id. at 376.
154. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374, 376 (emphasis added); see also id. at 372 (“[T]here was no
showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or
for the sole purpose of investigation.”); id. at 375 (noting that “[n]othing . . . prohibits the
exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity”).
155. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see also id. (“Our view that standardized criteria or established routine must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory
searches is based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” (citations omitted)).
156. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 7.4(a), at 852–54 & nn.83–85 (citing cases); see also id.
at 851 (rejecting the proposition that “any inventory undertaken in compliance with a police
department regulation is lawful”). But cf. Dix, supra note 128, at 439–40, 439 n.271 (reading
Brigham City’s reference to “‘programmatic purpose’” and use of a “‘see also’” citation to
Wells as “strongly hint[ing]” that subjective motivation is no longer relevant in inventory
search cases (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006))).
157. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 444 (1973).
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relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” 158 In upholding the
search of an arrested police officer’s vehicle after the car had been
towed to a garage, the Court emphasized that the “purpose of [the
search] was to look for respondent’s service revolver” and “the justification” was therefore “concern for the safety of the general pub159
lic.” Even if Brigham City’s failure to cite Cady can be attributed to
the Court’s assumption that community caretaking searches are
limited to automobiles or do not involve the same sense of urgency
160
as emergency aid cases, there is still considerable overlap between the rationales underlying community caretaking and emer161
gency aid searches. Brigham City’s unexplained departure from
Cady’s reliance on the searching officer’s motivation is therefore
troubling.
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court opinions have viewed Cady v. Dombrowski as an impoundment case. In recognizing the constitutionality of warrantless inventory searches in Opperman, for example, the Court relied on Cady and described an inventory search
162
as “a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile.” The
fact that the Court sees the administrative-like inventory search as
falling within the community caretaking umbrella thus provides
further support for likewise treating all non-law-enforcement exigent circumstances searches as a type of administrative inspection
163
and incorporating a subjective motivation requirement.
Analogizing emergency aid searches to inventory searches does
not undermine the probable cause standards endorsed above. Admittedly, the Court’s inventory search precedents have admonished that “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not
implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of
164
probable cause.” But the Court has required a form of probable
cause in other administrative search cases. Reasoning that the
158. Id. at 441.
159. Id. at 437, 447; see also id. at 443 (noting that the search was “‘standard procedure in
[that police] department,’ to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall
into untrained or perhaps malicious hands” (alteration in original) (quoting the lower
courts)).
160. See supra note 111.
161. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
162. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976) (emphasis added); see id. at
370 n.5 (observing that an inventory search serves “routine administrative caretaking functions”); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (likewise citing Cady and referring to “police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody”).
163. Cf. Dimino, supra note 102, at 1522 (describing administrative searches as “examples of community caretaking,” though arguing that they differ because administrative inspectors “serve those non-law-enforcement purposes by enforcing the law”).
164. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371; see also Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5 (noting that “[t]he
standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures”).
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Fourth Amendment’s “test of ‘probable cause’ . . . can take into ac165
count the nature of the search that is being sought,” the Court
held in Camara v. Municipal Court that the probable cause necessary
to support the administrative warrants needed for housing inspections “exist[s] if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
166
particular dwelling.” Likewise, in discussing the permissibility of
administrative searches to determine the cause of a fire, the Court
in Michigan v. Tyler relied on Camara and observed that “[t]he
showing of probable cause . . . may vary with the object and intru167
siveness of the search.” Thus, requiring probable cause for nonlaw-enforcement exigent circumstances searches is not inconsistent
with viewing them as administrative inspections.
More fundamentally, a showing of probable cause is unnecessary
in inventory search cases because the Court has relied on an alternative method of limiting the discretion of the officers who conduct those searches: they must have been “following standardized
168
procedures.” Police departments cannot create standard operating procedures for cases involving exigent circumstances because
the existence of an exigency by definition “must be determined
169
case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” The
probable cause standards advocated in this Article thus substitute
for regularized procedures in satisfying the Court’s requirement
that administrative searches must include some mechanism to cab170
in the discretion of the individual inspectors.
165. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
166. Id. Although there is some scholarly support for requiring Camara-type administrative warrants for at least certain community caretaking searches, see Marinos, supra note 31,
at 283–89, others have pointed out that these cases “arise on the spur of the moment . . .
without [the] forewarning” necessary to enable police to obtain a warrant. Dimino, supra
note 102, at 1521. For other sources rejecting a warrant requirement in non-lawenforcement exigent circumstances cases, see Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542,
563–66 (7th Cir. 2014); Decker, supra note 101, at 532; Helding, supra note 111, at 155–58.
167. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978).
168. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372; see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (likewise requiring that police follow standard practices in determining which containers to open during an
inventory search).
169. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013); see also Dimino, supra note 102, at
1527 (pointing out that “protocols for dealing with community-caretaking situations . . .
would be a poor fit for many of the events police officers must encounter”).
170. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973) (requiring probable
cause to conduct an administrative search of a vehicle near the border in order to limit the
discretion exercised by law enforcement officials); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341–42 (1985) (concluding that reasonable suspicion is needed to justify the administrative
inspection of a student’s purse); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975)
(holding that reasonable suspicion is necessary to stop vehicles close to the border in order
to constrain inspectors’ discretion); Brensike Primus, supra note 133, at 272 (noting that, in
some of its administrative search opinions, the Court has “relied on a post hoc analysis of . . .
the government’s showing of individualized suspicion” in order to “cabin executive discre-
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When law enforcement officials make a warrantless exigent circumstances entry to protect someone’s person or property, they
are, in essence, conducting an administrative search. Drawing from
the Supreme Court precedent assessing the constitutionality of
other administrative inspections, courts should permit this subset
of exigent circumstances searches only if there is some discretionlimiting mechanism in place (here, probable cause) and if the police acted for the proper reasons. These exigent circumstances
searches should therefore survive constitutional scrutiny only if the
officer’s primary motive for entering was to provide assistance or
serve some other non-law-enforcement interest.
171
Although ascertaining an actor’s motive can be difficult, the
Court pointed out in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond that “courts routinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct
172
from that which is lawful.” In addition, the Court’s administrative
inspection rulings have instructed judges to “consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary pur173
pose.” Thus, courts can analyze, for example, whether the actions
taken and the questions asked by officers who purportedly made
an emergency aid entry were consistent with the primary goal of
providing assistance or, instead, suggested a motive to uncover evi174
dence of a crime.

tion”). But cf. Dimino, supra note 102, at 1528 (viewing a subjective motivation requirement
as a sufficient “discretion-limiting” mechanism); Fox, supra note 111, at 425 (same).
171. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46 (2000) (acknowledging “the
challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry”); see also supra notes 115–19 and accompanying
text.
172. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46–47; see also Dix, supra note 128, at 472 (finding “no obvious
reason why expeditions into the minds of police officers should be any more difficult or expensive” than mens rea “inquir[ies] into the minds of those accused of crime”). But cf. Kaye,
supra note 127, at 1126, 1120 (describing “[m]ixed-motive or primary-purpose analysis” as
“notoriously slippery” and “a major headache in many areas of the law,” and therefore arguing that “multipurpose search regimes should be eligible for special-needs balancing”).
173. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001); see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at
46 (observing that “we examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of
the checkpoint program”); Dix, supra note 128, at 473 (noting that “circumstantial evidence—specifically . . . the officer’s conduct . . .—could permit an inference” as to the officer’s subjective state of mind).
174. See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (summarizing the defendant’s argument that the officers there “could not have been motivated by a perceived
need to provide medical assistance, since they never summoned emergency medical personnel”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) (describing the state supreme court’s
observation that the police “had not sought to assist the injured adult, but instead had acted
‘exclusively in their law enforcement capacity’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d
506, 513 (Utah 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 398 (2006))); cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507
(1978) (suggesting “relevant factors” to evaluate the permissibility of an administrative entry
to investigate a fire scene, including “[t]he number of prior entries, the scope of the search,
the time of day when it is proposed to be made, [and] the lapse of time since the fire”).
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the Supreme Court has failed to clarify what showing of exigency is needed to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. At times requiring probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, the Court on other occasions has
used vague and undefined terms like “reason to believe” without
situating that standard on the probable cause/reasonable suspicion
continuum. Not surprisingly, the conflicting signals coming from
the Justices have led to disagreements among the lower courts.
In resolving that conflict, this Article has argued that two distinct
findings of probable cause should be required to support a warrantless exigent circumstances search. First, there is no justification, and no support in the Court’s precedents, for departing from
the traditional mandate that police need probable cause to enter
for any exigent circumstances search. Second, probable cause of
exigency—probable cause to believe that some untoward consequence would arise if the officers took the time to obtain a warrant—should also be necessary for any full search. Reasonable suspicion of exigency should suffice only for less invasive intrusions,
such as protective sweeps, no-knock entries, and impoundments of
the premises while police seek a warrant.
Finally, when the police want to rely on non-law-enforcement interests to make a warrantless exigent circumstances entry—the socalled emergency aid and community caretaking searches—they
are essentially conducting an administrative inspection. Consistency with the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings in that area therefore requires a third justification. Ensuring that these intrusions
truly are intended to further their administrative purpose of
providing assistance, and are not pretextual searches for evidence,
calls for overruling the Court’s decision in Brigham City v. Stuart
that an individual officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant.
When evaluating this subset of exigent circumstances searches,
then, courts should also analyze whether the officer’s primary reason for entering was to offer assistance or instead to investigate a
crime.

